What is going on with Bush’s surge
By Michael Schwartz
March 1, 2007
If you are trying to figure out how the new Bush strategy is progressing, or just trying to figure out what is happening in Iraq, here is a diagnosis and a bit of a prognosis.
In his speech, Bush promised three prongs to the new strategy: (1) confronting Iran; (2) attacking and neutralizing the Mahdi’s Army militia; and (3) a new offensive against the Sunni insurgents.
Iran
There are all sorts of symptoms of the new approach, extending from the (mostly trumped up) accusations about Iran supplying the insurgents, through the (apparently random) arrests of accused Iranian infiltrators and their Iraqi allies; to the stationing of a second aircraft carrier group in the Gulf (with another supposedly on the way). And the media is carrying a constant stream of reporting about possible U.S. or Israeli air attack on Iran itself.
The accusations about Iranian “interference” with Iraqi internal conflict and politics are particularly ironic, and not just because the idea of the U.S. accusing anyone else of “outside interference” in Iraq is so absurd. The most dramatic accusation is that the Iranians are supplying the insurgency with a new type of IED that can pierce armor. Maybe…or maybe not. But if they are, they are supplying the Shia insurgents (even the U.S. military admits to that), and the U.S. is not (currently) fighting the Shia insurgents—they are fighting the Sunni insurgency, which hates Iran as much as it hates the U.S. So this accusation, which is carried by the press as a claim that a large proportion of American casualties are caused by Iranian weapons, is absurd.
The same can be said about other US claims against Iran, even including those about nuclear weapons development—the latest US intelligence reports say that the Iranians could develop a bomb in about ten years, hardly the sort of immediate threat that the Administration might actually rely on as a justification for an attack.
But the fact that these accusations are baseless makes it appear all the more likely that the Bush Administration is constructing them in order to justify an already-planned attack—just as they did four years ago in the run-up to the Iraq invasion.
There are, unfortunately, lots of indications that the U.S. is going to attack Iran or have the Israelis do it. The presence of two battleship groups is the most visible, the appointment of a new commander in Middle East theatre whose experience is centered on air and sea attacks is another, and the recent reports of military protests (including unprecedented threats of high level resignations) are all tangible signs of serious intent.
But many equally plausible indications were present last spring, and the attack did not occur, presumably because the saner heads inside the Bush Administration prevailed. This reflects the fact that even from the point of view of those who embrace the goal of American pre-eminence in the Middle East (which requires reversing the upward trajectory of Iranian power), such an attack would appear to be counterproductive. Instead of stabilizing the situation in Iraq and reducing Iranian leverage in the region, it would further destabilize Iraq (because Iran’s Shia allies would certainly respond forcefully and violently), and it might even undermine the viability of Saudi Arabia (because Shia rebellions could spread to that country). Most significantly, instead of dislodging the Iranian regime, an American attack would entrench it; And instead of restoring American credibility as a indomitable military presence in the Middle East, the failure of such an attack would further undermine it (as the fruitless Israeli attack on Lebanon did).
So the logic of the situation suggests that all this is saber-rattling; an attempt to use the threat of war to wrest concessions from the Iranians. But we are dealing with the Bush administration, which has a habit of pursuing “counterproductive” policies. We must watch the events in the next month or so, particularly the current talk about actual negotiations between the Bush Administration and the Iranian regime.
The Mahdi Army
The intention to dislodge, disrupt or destroy the Mahdi army, the guerrilla force commanded by Moqtada al Sadr, appears to be guaranteed to fail. It is just a matter of what sort of failure the U.S. will choose.
As the new strategy has so far been implemented, the tactics seem designed to yield a modest (and not overly destructive) failure. U.S. troops have begun operations in Sadrist strongholds (notably Sadr City), which were, until late last year, “no go zones” for the Americans. But they are not attempting to pacify them, as they do in Sunni neighborhoods. Instead they are mounting raids designed to arrest specific Sadrist leaders and leaving the rest of the community alone. So far, the Mahdi’s have decided to lay low and not resist the American intrusions (though the targeted individuals are often gone when the Americans arrive). There is even some talk that Sadr is cooperating with the arrests, directing or allowing the Americans to apprehend “rogue” Mahdi leaders who have not been following the leadership’s orders.
This strategy, however, will leave the strength of the Mahdis unimpaired. It cannot generate sufficient arrests to decapitate the militia; nor can its “hit and run” tactics undermine the political and military domination exercised by the Sadrists in these neighborhoods. At best, it is a kind of ongoing harassment and a symbolic denial of Sadrist power. It cannot, therefore, dislodge the Mahdis from their leadership position in most Shia communities inside and outside of Baghdad.
It will not be surprising, therefore, if the U.S. escalates these raids into full scale attacks on Sadrist strongholds. This will involve the sort of brutal invasions they currently undertake in Sunni neighborhoods. Typically these attacks begin when U.S. troops close off the area, demand that all women and children leave and then initiate a house-to-house sweep, treating the community as a “free fire” zone. They inspect each house for lurking insurgents or other suspicious characters (basically any fighting age man) and search inside and outside for arms caches (which are plentiful), destroying or attacking anything or anyone that evades the invaders, hinders the search, or offers any sort of resistance. The level of destruction is quite awesome.
If the U.S. tries this in Sadrist strongholds, the Mahdis will have no choice but to fight back, because they alternative is to sit by while their communities are pillaged. This will then trigger a guerrilla confrontation much like the most ferocious fighting that we have seen in Sunni areas. The battle of Tal Afar, which reduced a quarter of that city to rubble that (18 months later) has yet to be cleared, has been explicitly referenced as a model for these sort of offensives.
It is one thing to mount attacks like this against the Sunni minority. When and if the US uses this strategy against the 60% majority Shia community, the response will surely spread around the country. The Mahdis will certainly retaliate in other neighborhoods and wherever the Americans are vulnerable. If the American military is almost drowning in the Sunni insurgency, imagine their predicament if they have to fight the Shia as well.
Such a development would have two clear consequences. One would be a huge escalation in the amount of fighting and the strain on the American military. The current reluctance of military leaders to embrace the surge will be amplified exponentially, and perhaps might congeal into real opposition. The other consequence would be a dramatic increase of air power to back up the troops on the ground, a development that would result in a massacre of unprecedented numbers of Iraqis, together with the rubblization of substantial portions of Baghdad and other Iraqi cites. In the end, this would (whether the Americans explicitly stated this or not) devolve into a case of indiscriminate slaughter aimed at bombing the Shia into submission.
If the US military stays with its current strategy of surgical incursions, it can escape with only a modest defeat. If it escalates, it is courting unmitigated disaster in the wake of unprecedented brutality.
Attacking the Sunni insurgents
What might happen in Shia neighborhoods is already the sad reality in Sunni communities and cities. For the most part, the new strategy in Sunni areas is the same old strategy we have seen before, not only in the major battles like Falluja, Najaf and Tal Afar, but in various neighborhoods of other cities, like Ramada or Baiji or Samarra. But there are two new twists. One is the intention of keeping American troops in those neighborhoods—to establish long term stability and facilitate reconstruction—after they are “cleared of insurgents”; and the other is to build (reports indicate 14) small military bases (really glorified police stations) in Baghdad hot spots, where American troops will stay around the clock the orderly ascendance of the Iraqi government is assured.
The first prong of the new policy is doomed. No area in Baghdad or in Iraq has been successfully pacified. This includes Falluja and Tal Afar, where this very strategy has been applied and has failed. In Falluja, a large (about 1000) contingent of American troops (supplemented by Iraqi (Shia) troops) has been there for 27 months since city was “cleared,” establishing a particularly harsh form of martial law, and nevertheless the insurgency has slowly grown again without ever having disappeared. Falluja is not pacified and the Americans have specifically refused to initiate reconstruction. In other cities, with less comprehensive occupations, the insurgency is even more robust, and there is no talk of reconstruction.
American implementation of this plan in Baghdad has already begun, with the devastating offensive in Haifa Street, which quickly escalated into the wholesale destruction of the neighborhood, and has since devolved into case of ethnic cleansing; residents who left during the heavy fighting are not being allowed back in by the Shia police and military that were brought in with the Americans. We can expect a regular diet of such clashes, marked why the liberal use of tanks, artillery and air power that devastate neighborhoods, followed by sectarian struggles over who will repossess the destroyed buildings, usually resolved in favor the Shia allies of the American troops.
The second prong of the new policy—the creation of a permanent U.S. presence in insurgent strongholds, has just now begun to be implemented. Besides the fact that 14 outposts could not hope to purge the city of Sunni insurgents, this tactic provides a stationary target for guerrilla fighters in the neighborhood, and is therefore an invitation for well-planned attacks. In Ramadi, where this strategy is being implemented, there has already been a successful carbombing at the most important of the American posts, and it seems likely that this is only the beginning. We should expect reports of various forms of attacks against these bases as soon as the Sunni insurgents get their bearings and develop their strategic plans.
The Bottom Line
We are looking at desperate measures aimed at reversing the decline of American power in the Middle East. In all three areas designated by the surge plan, this desperation has led to the consideration or embrace of more and more destructive strategies. In the confrontation with Iran, the Bush Administration appears to be lurching toward an air assault on numerous targets inside Iran, guaranteeing awesome levels of civilian casualties. In the confrontation with the Sadrists, the Bush Administration appears to be edging toward search and destroy operations that will rubblize Shia neighborhoods. In the confrontation with the Sunni insurgents, the Bush Administration is mobilizing the full force of its ground and air power with the promise of the subsequent the imposition of an extreme form of martial law. The hallmark of all these new strategies is the high level of destruction, and mayhem that they involve.
There is a larger pattern that should, by now, be clear in these developments, and all that have come before. The architects of American policy in the Middle East will keep escalating the level of brutality until they convince the Iraqis (and the Iranians) that only way to avoid indiscriminate slaughter is to submit to a pax Americana. Put another way, American policy in the Middle East has devolved into unadorned state terrorism.
Michael Schwartz, Stony Brook State University
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